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Note
PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY VIA
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F)
RYAN M. CARPENTER
In 1975, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
incorporating section 13(f) on Periodic Reporting requirements of
institutional investment managers. The law mandates that institutional
investors file a holdings report, known as Form 13F, with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for public distribution. The law provides filers
with confidential treatment when in the public interest.
This Note argues that the SEC has not implemented section 13(f) in a
way that achieves Congress’s professed goal of providing more egalitarian
access to information about the financial and security markets, both by
neglecting to effectively administer the program and failing to promulgate
a meaningful standard for exemption. It also argues that this failure is
detrimental to the efficiency of the securities markets. It makes the case
that the SEC should more deliberately balance the competitive interest of
institutional investment managers with the public interest in transparent
and efficient markets when administering the regulation.
By harmonizing section 13(f) with existing securities regulation
doctrine, this Note ultimately arrives at suggestions for improvement,
namely that the law be deployed as a mechanism for sharing gains with the
market and that confidential treatment be granted only when necessary to
avoid inflicting losses on an institution, as opposed to protecting future
potential gain. This Note also makes corollary suggestions that modernize
the administration of the law and provide for more rigorous enforcement
policies.

763

NOTE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 765
II. A REVIEW OF EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F) ........................... 769
A. SECTION 13(F) STRIKES A BALANCE BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS’ COMPETITIVE INTERESTS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN TRANSPARENT MARKETS ........................................... 769
B. CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT OF SECTION 13(F) INFORMATION
ALLOWS INVESTORS TO AVOID INCURRING INVESTMENT
LOSSES IN CONNECTION WITH REPORTING ..................................... 774
III. LACK OF A MEANINGFUL CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT
STANDARD RESULTS IN PRACTICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE
APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 13(F) ...... 780
IV. ADVANCING MARKET EFFICIENCY
BY WAY OF FORM 13F REPORTING .............................................. 787
V. SECTION 13(F) AND AN INTEGRATED
SECURITIES LAW DOCTRINE ......................................................... 791
A. PREVENTING MARKET MANIPULATION ............................................... 792
B. DETERRING SPECULATION: PROTECTION FOR FUND INVESTORS ........ 794
C. FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET .................................................................... 795
D. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE: AN AVENUE TO
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SECTION 13(F) MALFEASANCE ...................... 797
VI. THE WAY TO MORE RATIONAL AND
HELPFUL FORM 13F DISCLOSURES .............................................. 800
A. UPDATE RULE 13F-1 TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE REPORTS ............ 800
B. DEVELOP AND PROMULGATE A CLEAR AND STRICT STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR GRANTING CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT ................ 802
C. ENFORCE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ABUSE OF
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT ........................................................... 803
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 804

PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY VIA
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F)
RYAN M. CARPENTER*
But the most common and durable source of factions, has
been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those
who hold, and those who are without property, have ever
formed distinct interests in society. . . . The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal
task of modern Legislation . . . .1
—James Madison, The Federalist No. 10
The distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of
authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal
citizenship and equality of opportunity.2
—John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that Cate is an investment adviser who, in the process of
managing her clients’ accounts, diligently follows all of the companies in
which she invests. She takes in relevant financial media daily, reads
analyst reports, and is sure to review all of their regulatory filings. She
uses this information to adjust her strategies accordingly. Let us assume
that many of Cate’s client accounts have long been invested in the stock of
Monolith, Inc., an industrial conglomerate with a revered CEO, and she
prizes the investment as a core holding because of its track record of steady
returns, its long-term approach to growth, and its policies of open
disclosure to its shareholders. As a result of Monolith’s successful track
record in its own operations and in partnering with other companies,
experts and market media tend to dwell on its every move.
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Princeton University, A.B.
2005. I would like to express sincere gratitude to James Kwak for his thoughtful guidance. Thanks
also to Kip Hall for challenging me to take up this subject at the outset. Casey Smith, Cassandra
Beckman Widay, Jeffrey Wisner, and the rest of the Connecticut Law Review staff provided valuable
editorial assistance for which I am grateful. As always, affectionate appreciation is due to my wife,
Lauren, for her enduring love and support. This is dedicated to Cadence—may your life be rich with
opportunity.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971).

766

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:763

Suppose now that Monolith makes a sizeable purchase of stock issued
by a troubled corporation, First Icarian Bank (“FIB”), for its own portfolio.
After making a series of bad investments in the asset-backed securities
market, FIB is cash-strapped and its share price has declined accordingly.
The market assumes that there is a decent chance that it will file for
bankruptcy. Monolith’s CEO believes that FIB is actually a turnaround
story about to happen, but does not want to telegraph his company’s
investments to the market. At times in the past, Monolith’s eventual
acquisition of a company could be traced back to a large purchase of
common stock. The CEO does not want others buying up FIB stock,
thereby forcing its market price back up and ruining what he sees as a
prospective opportunity for heady gain.
The quarter is closing soon, however, and his company must file Form
13F with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the
“Commission”), which would publicly disclose this information. Happily
for Monolith, it can apply for a temporary exemption from reporting its
FIB holdings on Form 13F. In the meantime and—if approved—for a set
period afterwards, Monolith does not have to tell anybody, potentially
including its shareholders, that it has made the investment. Monolith
receives the SEC’s permission to withhold information of its investment in
FIB stock from the public for twelve months from the date of purchase.
Cate, like many other active investors, has done her own independent
research on FIB, which has also been followed closely by the financial
press. She has concluded that the stock is a poor investment and that it
amounts to nothing more than a reckless and speculative gamble. Suppose
that Jack, a longtime FIB shareholder, comes to the same conclusion and,
fearing that the shares might soon be completely worthless, sells his stock
in the open market for a deep loss. Because Monolith received
confidential treatment regarding its Form 13F requirement, neither Cate
nor Jack knew about its investment. If FIB collapses in six months,
inflicting financial losses upon Monolith, Inc., Cate will suffer a
corresponding decline in the value of the shares in her accounts. She had
no opportunity to avoid this loss. If FIB survives and its share price
rebounds, then Jack will have cut and run without understanding all
material aspects of the company’s outlook.
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 requires
companies that manage investment funds to file Form 13F with the SEC on
a quarterly basis.4 The filing is required from companies that exercise
investment discretion over accounts holding certain securities that have an
aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million on the last trading day
3
4

15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2012).
Id.
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of any month of the preceding calendar year. Congress enacted section
13(f) in 1975 to increase the public availability of information regarding
the purchase, sale, and holding of securities by institutional investors.6
The text and legislative history of the statute make clear Congress’s
intent that information collected under section 13(f) be disseminated to the
public as promptly as possible.7 At the same time, it conceded that
sometimes “disclosure of certain types of information could have harmful
effects, not only on a filing investment manager, but also on the investors
whose assets are under its management.”8 To strike a balance between
these competing interests, section 13(f)(3) authorizes the Commission to
“delay or prevent the public disclosure” of information “as it determines to
be necessary or appropriate in the public interest” or for the protection of
investors.9 Part II of this Note will provide an overview of section 13(f)
reporting requirements, the confidential treatment exception process, and
its policy concerns. It will also introduce the core of the argument: the
section 13(f) confidential treatment reporting exemption should aim to
allow money managers to avoid losses in limited and extraordinary
situations wherein demanding compliance with regulatory reporting
requirements would, in itself, cause losses. It should otherwise require
disclosure, even when that would result in sharing some gains derived from
privately funded research with the public.
In order to fully understand the function of the disclosure requirement
and the exemption, this Note will then examine and appraise the practical
mechanics and underlying theory behind the regulation itself. This is to
uncover the ways in which section 13(f) reporting and its accompanying
confidential treatment exception present problems. First of all, there are a
number of practical shortcomings associated with application and
administration of the exemption that have received unfavorable political
and media attention. The lack of effective administrative processes and,
perhaps more importantly, the failure of the SEC to use the information
gathered by the report in a meaningful way cancel out much of the effect
that section 13(f) was intended to have on financial markets. Instead,
investment managers are left with yet another compliance cost without a
corresponding market benefit. These concerns will be examined in Part
III.
Secondly, there are well-supported theoretical problems with section
5

Id.
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,701 (June 22, 1978).
7
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.
8
Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment Requests, SEC Guidance Letter, 1998 WL 35318911, at
*2 (June 17, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Guidance Letter].
9
15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(3).
6
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13(f) confidential treatment. The vagueness of the controlling “public
interest” standard, particularly in its oft-avowed purpose of “protecting
investors,” is easily misdirected and ultimately unsound as a policy
justification. The public interest would be more expeditiously served if the
Commission were to focus on rules that furthered ex ante informational
equity that advanced market efficiency and liquidity. In Part IV, this Note
will take a look at the public interest in informational equity through the
lens of the smaller investor and consider also the countervailing interest of
institutional asset managers who invest heavily in research and strategy.
The best tack, I argue, is to find the middle ground: economic
principles and policy considerations demand that we preserve the fruits of
engaging successfully in informational competition for those who spend
their resources seeking them, but not in perpetuity. Section 13(f) is the
device by which institutional investors are eventually required to cede what
residual advantage remains in the information they have gathered for the
benefit of market efficiency and fairness over the long term, but only after
they have acted on it. In this way, not only does the regulation strive to
provide economic efficiency, but it also acts to align the law with public
interest and the legislative intent of section 13(f).
With these practical and theoretical concerns in mind, we will move to
Part V, where I seek to integrate section 13(f) and its confidential treatment
provision into the existing body of securities regulation doctrine as a
coherent whole. While section 13(f) is an underdeveloped and unsung
provision within the canon of securities laws, it is clear that it nonetheless
offers something distinct and important to the body of regulation. This
perspective on the regulation should color our understanding of the
confidential treatment allowance and underscore that it should only be
available in limited circumstances when not providing it would impose a
dilemma forcing the investment manager to choose between similarly
undesirable options: (a) not transact against the firm’s better judgment or
(b) risk subsequent loss as a result of disclosure.10 Such economically nonneutral regulations are to be discouraged to the extent that they would
inform an investment managers’ decision-making on matters that should be
dictated predominantly by economic substance. At the same time, liberally
permitting disclosure exemptions for unsubstantiated or insufficient
reasons might have the converse effect of allowing the investment manager
to gain by unjust enrichment.
10
This is, perhaps, most likely to occur in situations where the investment manager has
established a large position in some security and decides that she wants to liquidate the asset. If news
of her liquidation leaks into the market, through regulatory disclosure or otherwise, it may cause other
investors to run on the stock, forcing her to sustain losses before she is able to exit the position.
Because this is likely to have deterrent effects on investment in small or distressed companies that
would otherwise present worthwhile opportunities, the availability of the exemption here is sensible.
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II. A REVIEW OF EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F)
A. Section 13(f) Strikes a Balance Between Institutional Investors’
Competitive Interests and the Public Interest in Transparent Markets
In 1968, Congress became concerned with the effects that transactions
by large-scale institutional investment management companies were
having on the stock market.11 Its concern was rooted in a sudden increase
in trading volume in American securities markets, which the paper-driven
market infrastructure could not bear, resulting in sharp declines in stock
prices and a financial industry crisis.12 In response, Congress passed the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 “to provide greater protection
for customers of registered brokers and dealers and members of national
securities exchanges.”13 Additionally, both houses embarked upon the first
exhaustive independent congressional examinations of the securities
market since the studies completed in the early 1930s, which had resulted
in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
formation of the SEC.14
As a result of the examination reports, Congress ordered the SEC to
study and investigate such transactions on a continuing basis “in order to
determine the effect of those activities upon the maintenance of fair and
orderly securities markets, the stability of those markets, and the interests
of issuers of securities and of the public.”15 Citing “gaps in information
about the purchase, sale and holdings of securities by major classes of
institutional investors,” the SEC recommended that Congress empower it
with the capacity to require institutional investment managers to report and
disclose their holdings and transactions on a regular and ongoing basis.16
Concurrently, the President’s Commission on Financial Structure and
Regulation in 1971, as well as the Senate Subcommittee on Securities in
1973, similarly recommended improved disclosure by institutional
investors.17
In response, Congress adopted section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange

11
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed.
Reg. at 26,701.
12
Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, Self-Regulation and the National Market System, Address Before the Joint Securities Conference
(Nov. 18, 1975), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/111875loomis.pdf.
13
Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636, 1636.
14
Loomis, supra note 12, at 3.
15
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed.
Reg. at 26,701.
16
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17
Id.
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Act of 1934 as part of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. The law
added to the pre-existing body of section 13, the unambiguous purpose of
which is “[t]o substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry.”19 The reporting system called for by section 13(f)
was “intended to create in the Commission a central repository of historical
and current data about the investment activities of institutional investment
managers,” and thereby advance two separate congressional objectives.20
First, the disclosures would vastly increase the amount of market data
available, allowing for the effective study of how large investment
management companies affect the equity market and consideration of the
public policy implication of these effects.21 Secondly, in making the
Commission responsible for gathering, processing, and disseminating this
data, a uniform reporting standard and centralized database would be
possible.22 The legislative history for section 13(f) indicates that Congress
intended for the immediate and orderly dissemination of information about
institutional investment managers’ holdings and transactions to the general
public because it would “stimulate a higher degree of confidence among all
investors in the integrity of our securities markets.”23 It was concerned
with utilizing the methods of public dissemination that would be most
useful “to investors, issuers, and other institutional investment
Congress also directed the Commission to use the
managers.”24
information, in consultation with other regulatory agencies, to fulfill
regulatory responsibilities in a way that achieved uniform, nonduplicative
reporting by investment managers, in turn minimizing the cost and burden
associated with regulatory compliance.25

18
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (1979) (implementing section
13(f) requirements as Rule 13f-1); 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (adopting Form 13F and issuing instructions for
completing the form).
19
Spilker v. Shayne Labs., Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed.
Reg. at 26,701.
21
Id.
22
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.
23
Id. at 82; see also Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last modified Oct.
10, 2013) [hereinafter FAQ About Form 13F] (“Congress passed Section 13(f) of the Securities
Exchange Act in 1975 in order to increase the public availability of information regarding the securities
holdings of institutional investors. Congress believed that this institutional disclosure program would
increase investor confidence in the integrity of the United States securities markets.” (citation
omitted)).
24
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed.
Reg. at 26,704.
25
Id. at 26,701.
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On June 15, 1978, the SEC rolled out Rule 13f-1 in Exchange Act
Release No. 34-14852, implementing the disclosure program mandated by
section 13(f), effective July 31, 1978.27 Mechanically, Rule 13f-1 works
by requiring that every institutional investment manager that exercises
investment discretion with respect to accounts holding equity securities of
a class described in section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act that have an
aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million file “reports with the
Commission, in such form, for such periods, and at such times after the end
of such periods as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, but in no event
shall such reports be filed for periods longer than one year or shorter than
one quarter.”28 The filing document is known as Form 13F.29
Institutional investment managers are required to file a Form 13F for
each calendar quarter, no later than forty-five days after its close.30 The
report must include, as of the last day of the reporting period, “the name of
the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal
amount, and aggregate fair market value or cost or amortized cost of each
other security” with respect to which the institutional investment manager
exercises investment discretion.31 The securities that must be reported
generally include exchange-traded or NASDAQ-quoted stocks, shares of
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), equity options and warrants, shares of
closed-end investment companies, and certain convertible debt securities.32
This list of includable securities intentionally neglects a range of popular
financial instruments.33 For example, investment managers neither have to
report positions in bonds, debentures, or shares issued by open-end
investment (i.e., mutual fund) companies,34 nor report or net out any short
sale positions in includable security types.35
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 contains, however, a yet-to-be implemented provision amending
section 13(f) to require certain disclosures of short positions by

26

17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (1979).
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed.
Reg. at 26,705.
28
15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012).
29
17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (2012).
30
FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23.
31
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(A).
32
FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.; see also Official List of Section 13(f) Securities Users, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (June 18, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13flists.htm (publishing a file
for each calendar quarter containing the list of securities reportable under section 13(f) to assist with
the preparation of reports).
27
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36

institutional investment managers.
This amendment, section 929X,
mandates the disclosure of short sale positions to the SEC, which will
make such information available to the public, as with other section 13(f)
data.37 There is some disagreement among industry participants and
interest groups, at the time of this writing, as to whether the SEC would be
publicizing the short sale data in an aggregated format or on a firm-specific
basis.38
The Commission intended, in establishing the types of holdings that
were material for the purpose of this disclosure in 1978, to limit the
reportable stock positions to those that have the potential to impact U.S.
financial markets.39 Moreover, the SEC expressly acknowledged that it
had reflected on the influence that the rule might have on competition: it
concluded that disclosure would not significantly burden competition and,
additionally, “that any possible resulting competitive burden will be
outweighed by, and is necessary and appropriate to achieve, the benefits of
this information to investors.”40
The Commission acknowledged those benefits again, about half a year
later, when it revised the rule to require quarterly reporting rather than
merely annual reports.41 Market participants had stated that more frequent
reporting would be invaluable to trading desks, facilitate increased market
liquidity, and allow for competitive “comparison shopping” of investment
managers.42 Based on this input, the SEC concluded that quarterly filings
would be in the public interest and, furthermore, the “continuous flow of
information” demanded by the increased reporting rate would also be
useful for formulating policy.43
What would go wrong without section 13(f)? Congress appears to
have been concerned with the aggregation of information by those market
participants who have the means to purchase such an advantage. That is,
market participants with superior resources can deploy them to build up
36
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929X,
124 Stat. 1376, 1870–71 (2010).
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Letter from Richard H. Baker, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Managed Funds
Ass’n, to James A. Brigagliano, Deputy Dir., Div. of Trading & Markets, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2.7.11MFA.Letter.on_.Short_.Sale_.Disclosures.under_.Section.929X.of_.Dodd_.Frank_.pdf.
39
See Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,703 (June 22, 1978) (announcing that
the establishment of a de minimis exemption and the decision not to exempt foreign holders of U.S.
stocks are both decisions controlled by a concern for isolating the report to holdings that may impact
the market).
40
Id. at 26,705.
41
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-15461, 1979 WL 173407, at *2 (Jan. 5, 1979).
42
Id.
43
Id.
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substantial market advantages by essentially creating non-public
information and trading on it until it is, one way or another, fully
incorporated into the security’s price. This result undercuts confidence in
public markets because such privatized informational advantages will
result in concealing transactional opportunities that the public would
otherwise be able to participate in or, worse yet, would be on the losing
side of until the news is made public. Once the news is announced, the
average investor is likely to be aggravated and discouraged by the
systematic disadvantages that deprived her of an opportunity or caused her
losses. As President Ford remarked upon signing the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 into law: “Public confidence is a vital ingredient if
our capital markets are to continue to attract a wide variety of investors.
Though large institutions have become increasingly active as owners and
traders of securities, individuals still represent the backbone of the
American capital system.”44 Even now, when institutions execute the vast
majority of daily stock exchange transactions, the market’s inherently open
and public nature demands that regulators remain committed to a
framework of rules and systematic safeguards that preserve the interest of
public participants generally and avoid the privatization of all advantage.
Concern for individual investors is economically understandable.
Rational investors would be deterred from participating in markets that too
strongly favor an elite group of large money managers and thereby deprive
them of the opportunity to partake in positive investment outcomes,
forcing them to invest their money with the money managers that hold the
informational advantages and pay the fees required to do so. Moreover, in
the context of public companies, a failure to report specific equity holdings
to the investing public results in misleading shareholders—if investors do
not know what assets and liabilities underlie a security, they will not be
able to make an informed assessment of the issuing company’s financial
health and accurately price it.45
Some might argue that if such disclosures were not required by the
public company reporting requirements, Congress must have decided that
they were unimportant or best left confidential. It seems more likely,
though, that Congress meant to supplement the cursory securities holding
disclosures included in the consolidated financial statements with the more
44
President Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (June
5, 1975), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4970.
45
While public companies are bound to report financial results as part of the annual (10-K) and
quarterly (10-Q) filings required by the Exchange Act, such reports do not require a comprehensive
statement of securities held by the reporting entity. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)–(c) (2012). Oftentimes, the
reporter will list several of its largest security holdings and then clump the rest together in a single line
item marked “Other.” See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 74 (Dec.
31, 2010) (listing equity holdings in four corporations valued at approximately $34 billion followed by
a single line for “other” equities worth over $26 billion).
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granular Form 13F for those companies that meet the Rule 13f-1
qualifications and for which such holdings would be a material aspect of
their financial health. While disclosure of information is likely to level the
playing field and provide the fruits of institutional investor research to
individual investors for little to no real cost, the end-of-quarter-plus-fortyfive-days reporting period should allow an institutional investor enough
time to begin implementing a new investment strategy and, if its thesis is
correct, to profit from it. It may not have sufficient time to maximize those
profits, but the lost excess return is a cost of operating in efficient markets.
The legislative background and the administrative implementation of
section 13(f) indicate that, while it expressly stands for rather broad free
market principles like efficiency and fairness, Congress and the SEC
implicitly meant for the regulation to grant expansive access to institutional
investor information on controlled terms that would strike a balance
between the institutions’ desire to keep such information confidential for
competitive reasons and the public interest in keeping regulators and
individual investors abreast of the forces that are driving the markets—
thereby preventing investment management oligopoly and deception of
investors.
B. Confidential Treatment of Section 13(f) Information Allows Investors to
Avoid Incurring Investment Losses in Connection with Reporting
Exemptions from section 13(f) reporting requirements are available
from the SEC under subsection 2.46 Confidential treatment under this
provision was to be permitted in situations where the Commission
determines it “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”47 Congress made the exemption available because
it recognized that some instances of disclosure might not be in the public
interest, in that revealing the information could visit “harmful effects”
upon an investment manager and the investors whose assets are under the
firm’s control.48
In order to succeed in obtaining a confidential treatment exemption,
institutional investors must submit a request for confidential treatment
(“CT Request”) identifying the specific information that they would like to
refrain from disclosing as well as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
provisions upon which the request is based, and including a statement and
analysis of the grounds for the applicability of such provisions.49 If the
filing firm’s request is granted, such firm will receive confidential
46

15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(2).
Id. § 78m(f)(3).
48
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2.
49
17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2012).
47
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treatment with respect to the specified positions for a period of three, six,
nine, or twelve months measured from the filing date.50 CT Requests that
do not provide sufficient basis for the request or provide only conclusory
or generalized information are to be denied.51
In 1998, the SEC provided an explanation of the requirements for CT
Request filers in a guidance letter, particularly in order to explain that such
“requests can be granted only under certain limited circumstances.”52 The
letter explains that the Exchange Act and the applicable FOIA provisions
require that confidential treatment only be made available in instances
where the investment manager establishes “that confidential treatment is in
the public interest.”53 Congress acknowledged two categories of securities
information that would be in the public interest to not disclose in Form 13F
filings:
(1) information that would identify securities held by the
account of a natural person or certain estates or trusts; and (2)
information that would reveal an investment manager’s
program of acquisition or disposition that is ongoing both at
the end of a reporting period and at the time that the
investment manager’s Form 13F is filed.54
Section 13(f)’s legislative history reveals that the second scenario was
of concern because Congress believed that “generally it is in the public
interest to grant confidential treatment to an ongoing investment strategy of
an investment manager [when] [d]isclosure of such strategy would impede
competition and could cause increased volatility in the market place.”55
The SEC has supplemented the categories of information eligible for
confidential treatment under its statutory authority with two additional
types of information: (1) open risk arbitrage positions; and (2) investment
strategies that utilize block positioning.56
50

FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23.
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2.
52
Id. at *1.
53
Id.
54
Id. at *2.
55
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.
56
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2. “[T]he term ‘risk arbitrage’ refers to the risking of
capital in connection with a proposed merger, acquisition, tender offer, or similar transaction involving
recapitalization . . . . The term applies only to transactions effected after the public announcement of
the deal and before completion or termination of the deal.” Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed
by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-21539, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,318,
48,319 (Dec. 12, 1984). Rule 3b-8(c) of the Exchange Act defines block positioning as buying “a
block of stock with a current market value of $200,000 or more in a single transaction, or in several
transactions at approximately the same time, from a single source” with reasonable certainty that such
transactions could not be completed with another party on similar or better terms and selling the block
stock “as rapidly as possible commensurate with the circumstances.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-8(c) (2012).
Oftentimes, this type of transaction is done directly between large institutional buyers and sellers
51
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The SEC’s 1998 guidance letter outlined five general requirements for
a successful confidential treatment request under the common “program of
acquisition or disposition” exception.57 In October 2013, the SEC’s
Division of Investment Management released additional guidance to
describe further information that it identified as “particularly helpful in
reaching an informed decision on whether delaying or preventing public
disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the
protection of investors or to maintain fair and orderly markets.”58 The
2013 guidance update describes specific information that is helpful in
successfully supporting each of the general requirements outlined in the
1998 guidance letter.59 The releases do not ascribe any levels of priority or
relative weighting to the many factors considered.
Taken together, the two guidance releases provide a general sense of
the information that the Commission would like to review in connection
with a CT Request for reason of an ongoing acquisition or disposition
program. First, the applicant investment manager must show that its
company or fund is following a specific program by detailing measures
taken during the most recent quarter toward effectuating the program and
information regarding the program’s goal.60 The description of the
program “should be specific to each Reportable Security covered” by the
request, and discuss its timing, level of progress, and “ultimate goal” in
terms of percentage of each issuer’s total outstanding securities.61
Second, the applicant must show that the program is “ongoing both at
the end of the quarter and at the time of the filing.”62 This should include
evidence of recent purchases or sales in the securities subject to the CT
Request and, if applicable, why a program should be considered “ongoing
during any periods when no transactions occurred.”63
Third, the applicant must present evidence that disclosure of the
securities positions in question would reveal the manager’s investment
strategy by showing “how the purchases or sales of particular securities
that took place during the quarter relate to the manager’s overall
outside of the auspices of a national securities exchange so as to minimize the effects of the trade on the
market price. Block Trade, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blocktrade.asp (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
57
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3–4.
58
DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, GUIDANCE UPDATE NO. 2013-08: FORM 13F
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTS BASED ON A CLAIM OF ONGOING ACQUISITION/DISPOSITION
PROGRAM
2
(2013)
[hereinafter
2013
GUIDANCE
UPDATE],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-update-filing-requirements-for-certainelectronic-communications.pdf.
59
Id. at 3–4.
60
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3.
61
2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3.
62
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.
63
2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3–4.
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investment strategy” and how the public would be able to discern the thrust
of the strategy from those transactions.64 In order to support a claim that
disclosure would reveal a broader investment program, the request must
consider what information is already deemed to be public, why compliance
with the regulation would reveal the program given the “historical
snapshot” nature of Form 13F, and “how the public would discern from
Form 13F data the Institutional Manager’s intent” to transact in specific
reportable securities in the future.65
Fourth, the applicant must analyze how the disclosure would affect the
underlying securities holdings in order to demonstrate that the failure to
receive the “confidential treatment would present a likelihood of
substantial harm to the manager’s competitive position.”66 This section of
the CT Request should detail the likelihood that and manner in which the
filer’s “competitive position” in a security would be substantially harmed
by providing “a description and comparison of any prior instances of
market reaction to the Institutional Manager’s public disclosure of its
position in an issuer.”67
Lastly, the request must specify the period of time for which
confidential treatment is requested.68 This is to include an explanation of
the “projected timeframe” for achieving the “ultimate objective,” whether
there are other related regulatory disclosures that might impact the
timeframe for confidential treatment, and “any other factors that may be
relevant.”69
It is apparent from these guidelines that the SEC wants a lot of
information from CT Request filers. It is not clear, though, that it is
evaluating the information in a methodical way. More puzzling still, the
Commission has yet to specifically express its rationale as to how granting
CT Requests regarding a plan of acquisition or disposition can be in the
public interest, advance the general “protection of investors,” or further the
administration of fair and orderly markets.
What would go wrong without the availability of a confidential
treatment exemption for Form 13F? Large investors would likely point out
that mass disclosure of their positions generally disincentivizes them from
doing market research and investing in companies at all. If they cannot
earn excess returns by uncovering, through honest means, financially
relevant information not yet incorporated into the value of a company’s
securities, then they will stop doing it altogether. Considering that large
64

1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.
2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3.
66
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.
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2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 4.
68
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3.
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2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 4.
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investors play an important role in assessing the true value of corporate
enterprises and, accordingly, the securities that they issue, it would be
generally unwise to enforce laws that completely strip the reward out of the
work they do and the risks they take.
For a number of institutional investors who have long track records of
success and broad followings in the financial media, large transactions in
the stock of companies are highly scrutinized and, often, blindly copied by
large numbers of bandwagon jumpers. If the investor’s following is large
and voracious, and especially when it includes other institutional
managers,70 this following can cost her the fruits of her research. She may
not be able to build a large position or liquidate an existing one before the
herd of smaller copycats has rushed into or out of the stock, impacting the
price adversely for her and potentially ruining the opportunity that she had
uncovered. This scenario could result in increased volatility as well,
because the investor would be incentivized to liquidate or build large
positions more quickly than she normally would, rather than in a manner
that would minimize impact on market values.
With these effects in mind, the SEC requires that the money manager
affirmatively show that disclosure of the position on a Form 13F filing will
damage the institution’s “competitive position” by public dispersal of data
regarding its recent trading patterns.71 Considering applicable insider
trading law, one might assume that the investment program in question is
developed using publicly available information assembled by the
investment manager, though the program itself cannot be public
information and still meet the eligibility requirements for confidential
treatment.72
While indications like this one help market participants understand
what is not subsumed under the confidential treatment rule, the SEC has
not provided a definition of what constitutes demonstrable harm to
“competitive position” from disclosure.73 One might deduce, then, that the
70
Consider, for example, Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, John Paulson, and George Soros. The
Internet is replete with websites that use regulatory filings (including Forms 13F) to aggregate and
report upon the investment movements of stock market heavyweights, track their performance, and
report on their findings to the public, sometimes for a fee.
E.g., GURUFOCUS,
http://www.gurufocus.com/
(last
visited
Nov.
20,
2013);
STOCKPICKR,
http://www.stockpickr.com/list/latestpro/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
71
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.
72
Id.
73
It is worthwhile to note that Congress has not emphasized competition as a core consideration
of the Securities Acts, but rather as a peripheral concern:

[T]he Commission’s responsibility [is] to balance the perceived anti-competitive
effects of the regulatory policy or decision at issue against the purposes of the
Exchange Act that would be advanced thereby and the costs of doing so.
Competition would not thereby become paramount to the great purposes of the
Exchange Act, but the need for and effectiveness of regulatory actions in achieving
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standard is an open-ended one for fund managers. The SEC has offered
that it is within its discretion to provide an exemption if the applicant can
successfully show that revealing its positions would amount to a
discernible competitive harm.74 The “demonstrable harm” standard is
inadequate for the administration of CT Requests because it fails to
consider the exemption as a counterpart of the reporting regulation from
which it provides relief. While section 13(f)’s disclosure requirements
were enacted in order to advance full disclosure and freely available
information (because market efficiency is a derivative product of
maximizing information flow), the exemption is a counterbalance that
works to preserve incentives to competition for institutional investors.
Certainly, President Ford emphasized the value of promoting
competition in the markets upon signing section 13(f) into law, stating that
the 1975 amendments to the Securities Acts provided “new directives to
the industry and its regulators to insure that competition is always a prime
He
consideration in establishing or abolishing market rules.”75
simultaneously pointed out, though, that the market must function with the
highest degrees of financial capability, ethical behavior, efficiency, order,
and accessibility.76 For several of these enumerated goals, enhancing
competitiveness is a means to the end. For others—namely ethical
fortitude and accessibility—regulation must act to ensure that unbridled
competition does not trample them underfoot.
In considering the confidential treatment exemption as a balancing
device that prevents the forced inequitable disclosure of Form 13F
information by investment managers, application of the exemption should
be based on a determination of whether compliance with the reporting
requirements would be the proximate cause of losses in extraordinary
situations. In other words, we would be best served to think of it as a
shield and not a sword: Confidential treatment should be granted in
scenarios where it is necessary to protect an institutional investor’s
portfolio from regulation-imposed losses.
As discussed above, the quintessential case occurs when news of the
investor’s exit from a position might cause others in the market to sell their
shares in that stock quickly and preemptively, causing a price drop and
leaving the discloser with losses she would have otherwise been unlikely to
incur.77 It might also be used if disclosure makes the cost of an intended
those purposes would have to be weighed against any detrimental impact on
competition.
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 13–14 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 192.
74
1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.
75
Ford, supra note 44.
76
Id.
77
See supra note 10 (detailing a possible situation in which this might occur).
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merger or acquisition prohibitively high because of the size of the resulting
net loss to the economy generally, which might benefit from the greater
efficiencies achieved through industry consolidation and achieving
economies of scale. It is not to be used, however, as a tool to maximize
investment managers’ profits at the expense of market transparency. This
construction defies the law’s twofold purpose of simultaneously advancing
informational equity and fair competition.
III. LACK OF A MEANINGFUL CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT STANDARD
RESULTS IN PRACTICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE APPLICATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 13(F)
Section 13(f) reporting exemption protocol has recently been the
subject of much scrutiny from the SEC’s independent internal auditor and
market observers alike.78 The areas that have attracted the most criticism,
by and large, could be remedied if the SEC adjusted its administration of
the reporting requirements and the CT Request process to agree with
Congressional intent, and embraced the balancing act between public
transparency and protection from private harm.
In 2010, the SEC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a
review of the 13(f) reporting requirements and audit findings as to the
oversight of the 13(f) filing process.79 The report contained twelve
recommendations to the agency to strengthen its supervision of the
statutory requirement and demanded written corrective action plans for
each of the items.80 The OIG reviewed the 13(f) oversight process in light
of the statute’s intent to “improve the body of publicly available factual
data” regarding the activity of institutional investment managers and
“thereby increase investor confidence in the integrity of the U.S. securities
markets.”81 Moreover, the OIG sought to examine whether then-current
policies and procedures complied with statutory requirements, including
whether the review and processing of confidential treatment requests were
adequate and appropriate.82
The review found significant shortcomings in the administration and
supervision of 13(f) filings. First, the OIG found that the SEC conducted
78
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 480, REVIEW OF THE SEC’S
SECTION 13(F) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2010) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]; see also Heidi N. Moore,
Warren Buffett: Even Oracles Have Their Secrets, and the SEC Lets Them, AM. PUB. MEDIA:
MARKETPLACE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/easy-street/warren-buffetteven-oracles-have-their-secrets-and-sec-lets-them; Andrew Ross Sorkin, One Secret Buffett Gets to
Keep,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Nov.
14,
2011,
9:24
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/one-secret-buffett-gets-to-keep/.
79
OIG REPORT, supra note 78.
80
Id. at ii.
81
Id. at iv.
82
Id. at v.
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no continuous or systematic review or analysis of Form 13F reports or the
data found therein.83 In fact, “no Commission division or office had been
delegated the authority to review the Form 13F filings” and, as a result, no
office considered such a review part of its ongoing responsibility.84 Not
surprisingly, this lack of monitoring rendered the data “less useful and
reliable than Congress had intended.”85 The SEC’s monitoring procedure
for the filings was so inadequate that there have been at least twenty-two
documented cases of third party observers from the public informing the
agency about basic noncompliance by required reporters.86 For example,
the agency had been notified that certain filers had used the wrong form
and that other required reporters had failed to submit Forms 13F
altogether.87
This administrative failing is notable in part because Form 13F has
been highlighted as a useful, but underutilized, tool for detecting fraudulent
activity by institutional investment managers. For example, in the wake of
Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, through which he defrauded his
investors of approximately $18 billion,88 observers have pointed out that
the Madoff firm’s “slim 13F filing [was] a major red flag.”89 While its
September 30, 2008 Form 13F showed an equity portfolio valued at
approximately $237 million, Madoff’s firm had reported total holdings of
about $17 billion in other filings to the SEC a year earlier.90 The forms
should have also raised concerns in that the reported holdings were
inconsistent with the strategies allegedly employed by the company.91
While Madoff’s failure to comply truthfully with Form 13F filing
requirements is an inherent hazard embedded in any self-reporting
regulatory regime, closer inspection of filings that are supposed to be part
of a useful centralized and standardized repository of information may well
have played a meaningful role in uncovering the long-perpetrated fraud
sooner, saving the victims millions of dollars in losses. The system of
Form 13F administration, which has been deferential to investment
companies at best and asleep at the wheel at worst, fails to affect the
balance between competition and transparency that the regulation is
designed to achieve.
83

Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
85
Id. at 9.
86
Id. at 11–12.
87
Id.
88
The Madoff Scam: Meet the Liquidator, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (June 20, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/24/60minutes/main5339719.shtml.
89
ALT. INV. GRP., MADOFF SCANDAL: CASE, RED FLAGS, AND LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2009),
available at http://altinv.com/news/view/8.
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Id.
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Related to this observation is the OIG’s finding that Form 13F does not
currently require “disclosure of all significant investment activities of
institutional investment managers.”92 Specifically, the OIG found that the
universe of reportable security types under section 13(f) had not been
updated since the enactment of the statute in 1975, nor had the reporting
threshold been increased to keep pace with inflation and the extraordinary
growth of the investment management industry.93 As a result, more
modern and complex investment vehicles such as derivatives, mutual fund
shares, and hedge positions are not reportable.94
Because the Dodd-Frank amendments to section 13(f) have not yet
been implemented through an SEC rule, industry observers have persisted
in complaining that short positions are not reportable, and that their
omission misleads not only the public perception of an institutional
investment manager’s net positions, but also the market’s general
perceptions about the financial health of companies that offer public
securities.95 Moreover, the failure to increase the reporting threshold has
resulted in an enormous uptick in the number of firms required to file and
significantly increased the burden on the agency without increasing the
efficacy of the reporting mechanism.96 Neglecting to adjust the reporting
requirements in order to conform to current stock market realities and
simultaneously allowing the costs of administering the program to grow
exponentially appear to contradict the congressional purpose to increase
market transparency for traders and aggregate useful data for regulators.
Providing piecemeal information about investment managers’ portfolios,
92

OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 25.
Id. at 25–26.
94
Id. Ironically, when President Ford signed the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 into law,
including section 13(f), he declared that the law was part of vital efforts to continually improve the
operation of the financial markets and to ensure that antiquated laws and regulations did not “unfairly
interfere with the need for changes” as markets evolve. Ford, supra note 44.
95
See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Disclosure by Short-Sellers Would Improve Market Clarity, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 22, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/disclosure-byshort-sellers-would-improve-market-clarity/ (describing how short position disclosures would have
helped avoid a precipitous decline in Herbalife Limited’s stock price after David Einhorn of Greenlight
Capital emerged on one of the company’s earnings conference calls and asked several critical questions
because it would have prevented other investors from assuming that his line of questioning indicated
that he was in possession of negative information about the company and had taken a short position
when he had not); Meena Krishnamsetty, SEC Should Shorten the 13F Reporting Period, Not 13D,
INSIDER MONKEY BLOG (Mar. 16, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/sec-shouldshorten-the-13f-reporting-period-not-13d-2978/ (arguing that the short time periods that investment
funds require to build large positions offers support for the notion that Form 13F should be required
more frequently, on a shorter timeline, and include short-sale positions). But see Michael D. Kurzer,
Short-Sale Disclosures Would Force Investment Managers to Publicize Secret Sauce,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130922/REG/3092299
98 (“If the SEC adopts rules requiring public reporting of individual short-sale positions, an important
component of fund managers’ trading strategies would be made available to the public at large.”).
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OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 26–27.
93

2013]

PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY

783

rather than the complete picture, can also creates hazardous downside risk
for publicly listed companies.97 This, of course, makes it difficult to expect
Form 13F to advance sound and efficient security pricing, the end goal of
both transparency and effective regulation.
The OIG also reported two serious concerns with specific regard to the
CT Request process. First, the auditor found that a majority of the
confidential treatment requests that were selected for testing lacked
supporting documentation or a proper audit trail.98 The audit requested
twenty-five files for review and the agency could not produce any files or
provide any supporting documentation for twelve of the sample items and,
for another two items, no file could be located but supporting documents
were produced.99 When the auditor requested twelve additional files in
place of those that could not be produced, the agency could only provide
support for four items.100
As a result, the OIG concluded that confidential treatment requests in
many cases appeared to avoid processing, could have been lost or
misplaced and the confidentiality of the data contained therein
compromised, and that the Commission had been failing to comply with its
record retention policies.101 There is anecdotal evidence that the failure to
substantiate confidential treatment requests is common. An experienced
private practitioner in the field of securities regulation admitted that, in
“years of submitting confidential treatment requests,” he was never
required to substantiate a single one.102
Additionally, the OIG found that certain filers for confidential
treatment received de facto exemption from 13F disclosure even though
their applications did not meet the criteria for confidential treatment under
section 13(f).103 Any passage of time between the CT Request filing and
when the Commission issues a written response to the request results in
postponed disclosure of investment holdings in accordance with
section 13(f), essentially giving all or some of the investment manager’s
reportable securities positions de facto confidential treatment.104 The audit
found that, at times, cases of de facto exemption exceeded one year.105 It is
97
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Id. at 20.
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Id.
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Sorkin, supra note 78. The comment in Sorkin’s article comes from Christopher J. Hewitt, a
corporate partner at Tucker Ellis LLP and former partner at Jones Day LLP; his biographical webpage
asserts expertise in the areas of securities law and SEC compliance, among others. Christopher J.
Hewitt, TUCKER ELLIS LLP, http://www.tuckerellis.com/attorneys/christopher-hewitt (last visited Nov.
20, 2013).
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worth noting that this exceeds the maximum time limit available for
confidential treatment without refiling.106 Moreover, the OIG found that
when these long outstanding requests were reviewed, they did not meet the
substantive criteria laid out by the Commission for confidential treatment,
and the requests should have been denied.107 Because the Commission
never responded to the requests, the filers were able to utilize the Form 13F
CT Requests to inappropriately and indefinitely skirt the regulatory
requirement.
Financial media pundits have interpreted the results of this
investigation as evidence that, while the SEC contends that it grants
exemptions “for public interest reasons or the protection of investors,” the
rule is used to routinely exempt rich and powerful investors like Carl
Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Warren Buffett.108 While official statistics
detailing confidential treatment request application numbers and approval
rates are not available, there is evidence that a significant number of such
large investors are seeking confidential treatment: a SEC spokesperson has
confirmed that the agency receives about sixty confidential treatment
requests per quarter.109 These executives and money managers have been
reported to garner a high rate of success in their applications for
confidential treatment: one investigator found that Buffett’s Berkshire
Hathaway receives confidential treatment about half of the time that it
seeks it.110
Speaking of publicly traded Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s
conglomerate functions in many ways like a pooled investment fund, while
at the same time it is subject to the disclosure-centric regime of federal
securities laws. The disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts may
not be appropriately designed for a company that operates a significant
investment-based profit center outside of its otherwise primary industry but
does not offer fund interests that are subject to the requirements of the
Investment Company Act. It bears observing that the problem with
reporting exemptions extends beyond Berkshire; the recent past is littered
with examples of executives at publicly traded corporations operating
primarily in industries like banking and retail that invested corporate funds
106
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Moore, supra note 78. Bear in mind that while a fifty percent yield on such requests may
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high because of the confidential nature of the filings. Assuming that an in-house legal group or outside
counsel that has filed many Forms 13F likely knows roughly “where the line is,” it may be reasonable
to assume that half of the applications optimistically overreach in hopes of lucking out or gaining
temporary de facto confidential treatment due to administrative shortcomings. As noted above, there is
no widely disseminated understanding of where “the line” actually is and what test, if any, the SEC
employs in evaluating an application’s viability.
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in risky instruments and employed strategies not disclosed in detail to
shareholders.111
Full disclosure of large deployments of capital and key profit-seeking
strategies is at the heart of cultivating a culture of periodic disclosure
among public corporations in the United States. Allowing executives to
put corporate funds at risk without complying with mandatory disclosure
rules in a timely manner defies the law’s general emphasis on providing
accurate and complete information to all market participants
simultaneously. It also fosters a market culture that favors the informed
insider over the ordinary participant. As pointed out above, Rule 13f-1 and
Form 13F could prevent companies that operate like investment
management companies, but outside the scope of the 1940 Act, from
skirting important disclosures to shareholders about the extent and quality
of their financial bets just because the annual and quarterly financial
statements do not require that level of granularity.112
There are also logistical shortcomings. Even if a trade occurred a
single day before the reporting period closed, the forty-five day grace
period for filing is “an eternity” in the capital markets.113 As argued in the
prior section, the lag inherent in the section 13(f) reporting procedure
allows the investor ample time to initiate position-building or liquidating
measures, and any interpretation of section 13(f) that suggests that the
investor needs more time to execute profitable strategies is questionable at
best.114 Section 13(f) already gives the investor at least forty-five days, and
potentially up to 135 days, to accumulate the position.115 He should not be
111
See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, In Scrutiny of JPMorgan Loss, Bigger Questions Left Unanswered,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 16, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/inscrutiny-of-jpmorgan-loss-bigger-questions-left-unanswered/ (detailing how JPMorgan Chase suffered
massive losses with respect to the so-called “London Whale” investments in derivatives contracts not
disclosed in its regulatory filings); Moore, supra note 78 (commenting on how the now-defunct MF
Global brokerage firm, under CEO Jon Corzine, took massive risks with its treasury’s funds, took on
massive amounts of leverage, and ended up bankrupt); Sears Sees Rise in Fourth Quarter Profits
Despite Trading Losses, CNBC.COM (Jan. 10, 2007), http://www.cnbc.com/id/16562581/Sears_Sees_R
ise_in_Fourth_Quarter_Profits_Despite_Trading_Losses (reporting that Sears Holdings’ CEO and
former hedge fund manager Edward Lampert’s risky derivative investments for the department store
chain resulted in losses for shareholders). Whether companies that take massive bets in risky financial
instruments should be required to disclose such facts in a detailed manner in their 10-K and 10-Q
filings is a separate but important question. If Rule 13f-1 compliance was better enforced and Form
13F contents were made more comprehensive and valuable, such changes may not be necessary for the
consolidated financial statement reports. The Form 13F would become an important supplement to the
other financial reporting mandated for publicly traded companies.
112
See supra Part II.A.
113
Mebane Faber, Bring in the Clones, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Nov. 1, 2009),
http://wealthmanagement.com/alternative-investments/bring-clones.
114
See supra Part II.B.
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The 135-day maximum timeframe can be achieved if the investor were to initiate a new buying
or selling strategy on the first day of the quarter. The position would not be reported for the length of
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able to act secretly for as long as a strategy takes to fully implement. If he
is not able to establish or liquidate his position before the disclosure
requirements kick in, the regulation should, as a matter of policy, provide
the public with an opportunity to benefit from knowing about the move
before it is completed.
In addition to all the documented shortfalls in administering
section 13(f)’s requirements, the statute appears to be somewhat toothless
from an enforcement perspective. The agency has only brought one action
against an investment firm for failing to properly disclose its investment
positions.116 Public questions about section 13(f) and its shadowy opt-out
process have been repeatedly mooted.117 This insinuates that the playing
field, from the all-important informational perspective, appears to remain
slanted toward a Wall Street inner circle.118
Sophisticated market regulators and observers should not be surprised
that some long-unregulated private investment companies are hesitant to
comply freely with section 13(f) requirements when an avenue to
exemption exists.119 Hedge funds and other private investment groups,
concerned that their “proprietary” investment strategies comprise their
competitive advantage in a flooded market of investment managers, pride
themselves on being so-called black boxes and work to ensure these
strategies remain elusive to their competitors and the general public.120
Section 13(f) is designed to cut against that frame of mind, but the de facto
exemption from reporting that can often result from merely filling out an
unsubstantiated Form 13F CT Request and submitting it in a timely fashion
undermines the effectiveness of the regulation. This contrasts starkly with
Congress’s intent to empower the Commission to secure investor trust and
confidence by shedding light on an industry with a competitive stake in its
own secrecy.

the quarter, which I assume to be 90 days, plus the 45-day grace period for compiling quarter-end
reports.
116
Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 56,252, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2634, 2007 WL 2471810 (Aug. 15, 2007).
117
Sorkin, supra note 78.
118
Id.
119
See Edward Pekarek, Note, Hogging the Hedge? Bulldog’s 13F Theory May Not Be So Lucky,
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1079, 1084 (2007) (detailing the legal claim by hedge fund manager
Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog Investors that Form 13F disclosures are unconstitutional taking of trade
secrets in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
120
Moore, supra note 78. Interestingly, on the issue of property rights, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that mere disclosure to the SEC does not raise Fifth
Amendment takings concerns even assuming that petitioner has a cognizable property interest in
knowledge of its investment positions. Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
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IV. ADVANCING MARKET EFFICIENCY BY WAY OF FORM 13F REPORTING
In response to media attention toward the apparent inequity involved
with the administration of section 13(f), large investors have countered that
the confidential treatment exemption is required to maintain their
competitive advantage and to avoid disincentivizing investment research
generally.121 I will now turn to theoretical evidence that explains how
liberally granting CT Requests can inflict more negative effects on the
market generally than might be incurred by the manager who is forced to
disclose her positions.
In contrast to traditionally subjective fairness-oriented approaches to
policymaking, work by economic researchers supports the notion that
policy decisions about the public interest in promoting adequate disclosure
and increasing market efficiencies are less a matter of judgment and more
often an empirical question.122 This is partly the result of the minimalist
regulatory approach of the securities regime, in the sense that the law does
not grant authority to the government to positively assess the substance of
an investment or its worthiness for purchase or sale, leaving the success of
the instrument instead to judgment of its merits by the investing public,
which is ostensibly better informed as a result of the required disclosures.
Ultimately, the “dominating principle of securities regulation is that
anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he
wants at whatever price the market will sustain.”123
Nevertheless, as it is often inclined to do for its public policy-oriented
decisions, the SEC justifies the availability of Form 13F exemption as
simply for the “protection of investors.”124 This may be attributable in part
to the lack of a sufficiently articulated statement of goals in the legislative
history associated with this section of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975. Permitting selective section 13(f) filing exemptions is the equivalent
of making lower quality financial reporting acceptable under a regulatory
regime that typically angles to meet its goals by demanding high quality,
accurate statements of financial condition. The result is a redaction of
information that increases information asymmetry among market
participants. This Part suggests that equitable accounting policy provides a
foundational model for illuminating exactly what degree of disclosure is
actually in the public interest and whether and when exemption from
121
Sorkin, supra note 78 (reporting on an interview with Warren Buffett, wherein Mr. Buffett
“said that he did not believe that public investors should always be allowed to piggyback on investment
ideas made by professional investors, especially before they are finished buying”).
122
ANNE M. THOMPSON, SEC CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT ORDERS: BALANCING COMPETING
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 9 (2010).
123
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984).
124
FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23.
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disclosure requirements is acceptable.
In order to make an informed policy decision, one must first determine
the goals of the legislation in question. It has been widely stated and
repeatedly reaffirmed that the purpose of the federal securities laws is to
promote market fairness through disclosure of complete and accurate
information about securities and the markets on which they are traded.125
It is important, though, to understand why this policy is in the public
interest in order to properly apply it. While the vague platitude “protecting
investors” seems to have become something of a rallying cry for the SEC,
it is inadequate as a policy standard. Achieving general fairness or
defending purportedly small and defenseless individual investors from
fraud and exploitation by insiders should not be the perceived hallmark of
just financial markets.126 Such a concept is too closely aligned with ex post
notions of distributive justice that call for equality of outcomes, which
cancels out rewards for risk-taking and ultimately creates disincentives to
investment instead of ex ante equality of opportunity, which, by contrast,
incentivizes information discovery and investment.127 In this sense, large
investors arguing in favor of broad availability of the exemption are right.
The exercise of implementing the exemption should be informed, however,
by a narrower understanding of “opportunity” than many large investors
might insist upon.
As discussed, the legislative history and regulatory releases for
section 13(f) also mention the counterbalancing interest in not requiring
“harmful” disclosure of information.128 But the existence of information
asymmetry is the major reason for systematic ex ante risk-adjusted return
differentials across investors; such asymmetries are expected to benefit
large-scale investors who have increased access to information
characterized by increasing returns to scale.129 Proponents of allowing
disclosure exemptions for competitive reasons—often the large institutions
that benefit most from information asymmetry—argue that policies which
deprive them of their informational advantages are anti-competitive
because they disincentivize them from working for superior investment
strategies in the first place.130
Economic theory and empirical evidence support the idea, however,
that inequity in capital markets due to information asymmetry results in
125

JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (6th ed. 2009).
Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, 63 ACCT. REV. 1,
6 (1988).
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1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2.
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Lev, supra note 126, at 4–6.
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negative social consequences, including higher transaction costs, thinner
markets, lower liquidity, and, in general, decreased gains from trade.131
Underpinning this theory is the idea that free market participants, no matter
how small, are not “defenseless” or inherently exploitable by large-scale
managers and insiders because they have a number of options available to
them, including adoption of a broadly diversified and passive portfolio
strategy, recourse to legal and contractual methods of preventing insiders
from transacting in the securities of their own firms altogether, and
withdrawal from the market.132 Thus, while effective, these self-defense
tactics each introduce inefficiencies and costs into the market, borne by all
participants. Disclosure was designed, at the outset at least, to mitigate
these adverse effects and, in turn, to promote public welfare.133
This does not necessarily imply that securities regulators should adopt
a policy requiring that all relevant information be publicly disclosed.
Rather, information disclosure rules should be limited to ensure that the
transfer of information from the informed to the uninformed via regulatory
disclosures will be efficient—that is, the decrease in information
asymmetry by way of the transfer should result in an expanded investor
base and increased liquidity which, in turn, will lead to a broad increase in
opportunities for trade and risk-sharing, spurring diffuse increases to
welfare for most investors while minimizing the negative effects on the
reporting investors.134 On the other hand, it is not unimaginable that
aggressive disclosure rules might result in pure welfare redistribution, in
which some investors benefit materially at the expense of others. Such
information redistribution is permissible in only the most dire of
circumstances: if and only if a refusal to impose information disclosure
requirements would compromise market function entirely such that the
aggregated general harm to all exceeds the isolated harm to the
Thus, when the Commission is implementing the
disclosers.135
congressional mandate to allow disclosure exemption in cases that might
result in “harmful” effects, just how the agency perceives and measures
such harm is of central importance.
131

Lev, supra note 126, at 9.
Id. at 6–7.
133
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 123, at 670. Easterbrook and Fischel note that relying
exclusively on this description of federal securities regulation is too simple in the modern age and that
the regime persists now because it also—or perhaps instead—has found support from interest groups
representing securities issuers who utilize it to protect their own interests at the expense of investors.
Id. at 670–71.
134
Lev, supra note 126, at 10. The idea is analogous to the Pareto efficiency principle. An
allocation of goods, either input or output goods, is Pareto efficient if one cannot find a reallocation of
those goods such that one can produce more of something (utility or output) without producing less of
something else. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229, 230, 234 (1986).
135
Lev, supra note 126, at 10.
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Professor Baruch Lev of New York University Stern School of
Business has pointed out that recognizing “evenhandedness” in
implementation of perfectly efficient information redistribution “is
obviously impossible to achieve in most situations.”136 With that reality in
mind, he argues that the ex ante equity objective seems to provide a
standard that specifies the public interest: “The interests of the less
informed investors should, in general, be favored over those of the more
informed investors.”137 Employing Lev’s rule here shows us that the
balancing paradigm, qualified with a bias toward the less informed (and
therefore in favor of disclosure) and a higher bar in terms of substantiating
“harm,” can provide the SEC with clearer, more operational “public
interest” guideposts than currently exist under the “protecting investors”
and “preserving competition” rhetoric often invoked in discussions of
section 13(f). Use of this standard will, in general, continue to demand a
fact-driven analysis of the broad consequences of disclosure exemption
and resulting information asymmetries.
More importantly though, the standard shifts the SEC’s evaluation of
an application in such a way that the agency must think more critically
about the harm incurred by the information-sharer in relation to the gains
enjoyed by the information gainers. Arguments that information sharing
undercuts competition are categorically untrue under this rubric, and
should not result in successful application for exemption. Claims that
disclosure results in loss of opportunity would similarly be insufficient to
meet statutory or common law understandings of harm.138 The applicant
should instead be demonstrating real and tangible harm as a result of
disclosure—making the case that the firm’s situation is one in which
information disclosure is tantamount to devaluing the institution’s
investment book and, as a result, passing those losses on to the investors in
their funds or accounts or, in the alternative, to their shareholders. Because
the exemption’s plain and narrow meaning allows for an end-around in
situations where disclosure would harm investors, this is a plausible and
commonsense application. Allowing it to exist for the purpose of
maximizing gain for the institutions who might stand to reap the most
upside from being out in front of their own transactions—or,
correspondingly, for one pool of fortunate investors over all of the others—
136

Id. at 13.
Id.
138
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012) (setting the amount recoverable for securities fraud as the actual
losses, calculated as the value at the time of purchase less the value at the time of the suit or the value at
which the shareholder disposed of the stock, either before or after the initiation of suit, except for any
amount of the loss for which the issuer can prove was caused by something other than the
misstatement); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–44 (2005) (finding that private
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strikes a dissonant chord against the theme of fair and efficient markets.
V. SECTION 13(F) AND AN INTEGRATED SECURITIES LAW DOCTRINE
Functionally, federal securities regulations generally demand
disclosure as a means of maintaining fair dealing in the marketplace,
facilitating capital formation, and protecting against fraud.139 The
theoretical basis for this is rooted in the fact that investment securities are
not like cars or homes: the prospective buyer cannot effectively selfinspect the asset or hire a trained eye somewhat cheaply to tell him if
something is wrong with it before he plunks down a large sum of money.
It is nearly impossible for the average investor to reliably and
independently arrange for an inspection of the condition of a company.
Requisite accounting and analytical proficiency aside, the resources
consumed in such an exercise alone would easily make the upfront costs so
high that the investment would become nonsensical for all but the
wealthiest investors.
In designing the law, Congress made the decision to place much of this
cost on the issuer, who is generally more willing and able to bear it as a
cost of accessing capital markets. As part of this effort, section 13 of the
Exchange Act provided “mechanisms for mandatory disclosure
requirements” for the benefit of publicly traded markets.140 This effort was
not solely driven by the choice to make large amounts of high quality
information available to investors for their benefit and protection, but also
“by the belief that enhanced disclosures . . . would allow sound investing to
triumph over manipulation and speculation.”141
In angling to make manipulation less feasible and speculation less
prevalent, the resulting regime of mandatory disclosure reduces fraud,
which allows for allocative efficiency and maximizes the net benefit to
society.142 A host of important regulations do this work. One might
reasonably suggest that the annual and quarterly financial reporting
requirements of public companies under the Exchange Act,143 the internal
controls and independent audit standards mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act,144 and the sweeping fraud protections imposed by section 11 of the
Securities Act145 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act146 all do enough to
139
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
140
COX ET AL., supra note 125, at 548.
141
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142
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143
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144
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 103, 404, 116 Stat. 745, 755–57, 789.
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provide market transparency and efficiency, and that section 13(f)
provisions have not received attention because their work is repetitive of
these other filings and therefore unnecessary. Put differently, one might
ask what unique protection the section 13(f) reporting requirements
provide.
The answer is that the statute does not do something altogether
different than the other regulatory requirements. Section 13(f) is supposed
to prevent manipulation and control speculation, as well as inhibit fraud
and unjust enrichment by investment managers, while the other disclosure
requirements are intended to prevent manipulation and fraud by security
issuers. We can use the doctrine that has developed in the more robust
area of security issuance and periodic filing enforcement to define the
contours of section 13(f) requirements for institutional managers and how
they should be enforced.
A. Preventing Market Manipulation
It is well documented that Congress was motivated to protect investors
against manipulation of securities markets when it enacted the Exchange
Act: “There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon
mystery and secrecy.”147 The SEC has suggested that market manipulation
is epitomized by boiler room-style “pump-and-dump” schemes, which
entail hard-sell tactics in connection with the sale of a company’s stock
“through false and misleading statements to the marketplace.”148 “Often
the promoters will claim to have ‘inside’ information about an impending
development” or some foolproof alchemy that will allow them to convert
market data into accurate predictors of future market prices.149
In reality, these promoters have often purchased penny shares on the
market before initiating their selling efforts, and they stand to gain by
selling these shares after they have created a frothy, false market in the
security, causing the subsequent investors to suffer losses.150 Market
manipulation is not confined to pump-and-dump schemes. It extends
equally to all practices “intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity” including “wash sales, matched orders, [and]
rigged price[s].”151 In sum, “[i]t connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially

147
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152

affecting the price of securities.”
The Supreme Court has declared that
there is “[n]o doubt [that] Congress meant to prohibit the full range of
ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices.”153
Defining “artificial effects” on the market as those that have no basis
in the economic substance of the security in question, one could make the
case that permitting exemption from section 13(f) and therefore allowing
selective disclosure of securities positions is meant to control current
market prices for a stock by minimizing copycat investing and preventing
artificially suppressed or bolstered valuations. The fact that certain
investors are buying or selling a stock is not usually, in itself, material to
the stock’s intrinsic worth.154 Large investors claim that disclosure
artificially adjusts market pricing in this way as a basis for arguing that the
exemption from section 13(f) should be available to them.155
It seems more likely that exemptions allow institutional investors to
artificially keep the information they have gained from being incorporated
into the market price. In reality, all of the investment decisions made by
these institutions should be of equal value in an efficient market. By
arguing that certain buy-and-sell decisions are more worthy of confidential
treatment, the managers are usually admitting that those investments are in
securities that present an informational arbitrage opportunity. It is not that
the market follows them blindly, as many suggest. In reality, the market
could see that a prominent investor has taken a position in that security and
deduce that he knows something that has not been broadly disseminated.
Given section 13(f) disclosure requirements, hiding a position from the
marketplace is a form of price manipulation.
Not only does selective disclosure prevent natural market forces from
maintaining efficient pricing mechanisms, whether rationally related to the
valuation of the issuer or not, but it raises valid concerns about equitable
treatment. By making special exceptions available for large investors in
certain circumstances, the securities regulation regime risks playing
favorites and disadvantaging everyone else in the process. As one large
institutional investor said in criticizing confidential treatment, “If I’m
going to pull down my pants in public I want everyone to pull down their
152
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156

pants, too.”
This colorfully illustrates the point that Form 13F
confidential treatment exemptions should be approached with a skeptical
eye. Once the choice is made to operate a public securities market in an
open and transparent manner, it becomes difficult to equitably implement
selective provisions for confidentiality.
B. Deterring Speculation: Protection for Fund Investors
Speculation happens when investors chase excess investment returns
by buying up high-risk, high-return assets that do not have the fundamental
economic substance needed to support their market price and are more
likely to suffer deep losses.157 While not inherently a problem, speculation
tends to compromise investor interests and markets generally when
accompanied by large amounts of borrowing and regulatory schemes that
favor Wall Street firms and their ilk at the expense of individual
investors.158 It also increases the likelihood of bubbles, which can result in
traumatic financial market crashes and rippling macroeconomic effects.159
Within the context of investment management companies and the
funds under their purview, opacity encourages speculation. The market for
pooled investment products is saturated—there are over fourteen thousand
publicly available investment funds representing over $13 trillion in
assets.160 Over forty-five percent of U.S. households own such funds.161
Assuming most investors are rational, they would prefer to invest in
securities and funds that offer more reward, that is, where they expect high
rates of return.162 Of course, the only empirical evidence at one’s disposal
for seeking high rates of return is the record of historical returns garnered
by a particular fund or manager.
It is difficult, however, to glean from this information whether the
success is a result of skill, superior access to information, or just dumb
luck.163 As a result, average fund investors are more likely to place their
money into funds that have done well on the assumption that those funds
are more likely to continue to outperform. Funds that underperform, on the
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164

other hand, tend to disappear quietly.
This phenomenon, called
survivorship bias, means that investment fund opportunities available at
any given time typically look like they have been able to consistently earn
excess returns,165 when efficient market theory says that they cannot unless
they consistently take on outsized risk.166
This all creates incentives for investment managers to shoot for the
moon and, correspondingly, take on too much risk. The countervailing
check against this competitive impulse is transparency. If a rational
investor sees that a given fund has strongly outperformed the market and
then can see that it is because the manager has leveraged the fund—by
buying or selling securities with borrowed money or investing in
companies with unsustainably high debt ratios—he might decide that the
investment is a poor one in the context of his overall portfolio. Section
13(f) disclosure requirements prevent investment managers from hiding
risk on their holdings reports for the benefit of investors in the same way
that quarterly and annual disclosure requirements allow stock investors to
understand the particulars of risk and reward that face a corporate entity.167
To allow exception in the context of one and not the other is a
contradiction that is hard to justify.
C. Fraud-on-the-Market
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act168 and Rule 10b-5169 are the
164

Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–07.
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principal tools for promoting the informational integrity of securities
transactions.170 Despite their sweeping language and legislative rhetoric,
the law and its implementing rule have long been interpreted mainly as
antifraud provisions.171 To state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, “a
plaintiff must plead that in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false material
representation or omitted to disclose material information, and that
plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused [plaintiff] injury.”172
According to Rule 405 of the Securities Act, “material, when used to
qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject,
limits the information required to those matters to which there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security registered.”173 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the materiality threshold to contemplate a showing of
“substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,” the
misrepresentation would be of “actual significance in the deliberations of a
reasonable shareholder.”174 Or, in other words, there must be a substantial
likelihood that revelation of the truth “would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”175
The fraud-by-overt-deception-only view of Rule 10b-5 gave way with
the watershed decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,176 which acknowledged
that plaintiffs are able to take advantage of the “fraud-on-the-market”
presumption of reliance.177 This theory is premised on the idea that, in
open and liquid markets, the value of a given security is determined by the
totality of available information regarding the security’s issuer and its
business.178 Misrepresentations, therefore, defraud those transacting in the
security even if the market participants do not rely directly upon the
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
170
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179

misstatements or omissions. This creates what is now a well-established
“theoretical link” between Rule 10b-5 doctrine and the efficient markets
theory: a cardinal goal of the federal securities fraud proscription is to
prevent distortions in the market.180
While it may be improbable that courts would interpret lax
section 13(f) standards or systematic abuses as violations of Rule 10b-5
itself, these problems raise the same kind of fraud-on-the-market issues as
those in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. The analogy is helpful in informing
even application of the statute by the SEC and the courts. The presumption
that all relevant information in the market is incorporated into the stock
price and that a market price not reflecting all information inherently
misleads investors is directly applicable in the context of institutional
investment managers acquiring or dispensing of a security. Often, the
presence of large institutional investors in the stock of a corporation acts as
an implicit backing of management, sometimes even in cases where the
corporation’s fundamental financial indicators and short-term business
prospects are negative or limited. Whether a corporation can accumulate
that type of financial support in the market is material information in
evaluating its stability; because of their subordinated position in the capital
structure, institutional investors with large equity stakes are more likely to
ensure that the companies they invest in maintain or improve their
management and avoid risks associated with excessive debt and financial
distress.
Concealing the presence (or disappearance) of such an investor may
artificially support or suppress a stock price. This is glaringly obvious in
the context of exiting institutional support for a publicly traded stock. If
top-holder institutional investors do not have to disclose that they have
disposed of the stock until they have fully closed the position, the effects of
the changed risk profile and weakened corporate financial health are borne
entirely by remaining shareholders. Dominant investors can use the Form
13F exemption provision in this way to shift risk. Section 13(f) provisions
allow for the investment manager to begin liquidating the position silently,
but if she cannot complete the sales in a timely manner and the liquidation
is material to the value of the underlying stock, she will be forced to share
in at least part of any resulting losses.
D. The Unjust Enrichment Principle: An Avenue to Civil Liability for
Section 13(f) Malfeasance
Professor James J. Park argues that the subsequent application of Rule
179

Id. at 241−42.
James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345,
356 (2010).
180

798

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:763

10b-5 to insider trading matters reflects a jurisprudence that has become
concerned with the prevention of unjust enrichment over a strict adherence
to the limits of traditional fraud doctrine.181 By way of illustration, Park
points to the case of United States v. O’Hagan,182 involving a law partner
who worked on a potential tender offer for a client who was the acquirer in
the deal.183 O’Hagan, the lawyer, had no role in the negotiations with the
target company but became aware of the deal and purchased call options
and stock in the target company.184 When the deal became public
knowledge, O’Hagan profited substantially from the resulting rise in the
stock price.185 In addressing whether O’Hagan’s misappropriation of the
inside information violated Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court upheld his
conviction, holding that his liability is premised on the “fiduciary-turnedtrader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information.”186
In contrast to the classic theories of insider trading liability, which are
premised on a violation of Rule 10b-5 via breach of fiduciary
relationship,187 the O’Hagan misappropriation theory rests on either—or
both—an agency theory and a property rights theory.188 The agency theory
is based on the Court’s finding of liability in breaching the relationship of
trust between O’Hagan and his law firm, which was a non-party to the
transaction.189 In establishing the property rights theory, the Court
observed that the “company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as
property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.”190 In
acknowledging that this theoretical leap by the Court appears to prohibit a
broader range of conduct than classical theories of securities fraud, Park
concludes that the guiding rationale for prosecuting insider trading under
Rule 10b-5 constitutes an expansion from the antifraud theory into the
prevention of unjust enrichment by market participants.191
Park argues that there are three simple elements to the unjust
enrichment principle: it “applies to (1) deceptive conduct, (2) coinciding
with a securities transaction (3) that enriches some individual at the
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expense of others.”
He displays how unjust enrichment functions as an
expansive principle within the regulation of the securities market: it has
effectively been used in enforcement actions relating to matters of
qualitative materiality, broker-dealer misappropriation, mutual-fund
market timing, and stock option backdating.193 Similarly, the principle
might be applied to the section 13(f) exemption in that the regulation can
be used as a procedural loophole to protect investment strategies before
they have been fully deployed. Selective disclosure via the use of the
exception is in fact deceptive (although currently sanctioned) protection of
securities transaction information.
The problem with the exemption, though, is that if it is misused, it has
the capacity to enrich more informed investors at the expense of the less
informed. A disclosure-based system of market oversight should be
suspicious of a regulatory device that functions this way. If the regulation
fails in this manner, though, the shortcomings are a product of
administrative application, not the law itself. Legal biases toward those
already in more advantageous positions are bad for markets because they
discourage participation by everyone else, or otherwise encourage an “if
you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” mentality that makes the only rational choice
for investors to invest their money with institutional managers with the
informational advantages, resulting in more management fees for those
chosen institutions. The result is an indirect sort of government-sponsored
oligopoly in the financial management market. Ultimately, the unjust
enrichment theory, side-by-side with the fraud-on-the-market presumption,
suggests that improper use of Form 13F exemptions for anything except
the prevention of imminent losses should be actionable. Rule 10b-5
doctrine provides a blueprint for policing such improprieties and, at its
outer bounds, may provide for a viable avenue through which to enforce
noncompliance or abuse of section 13(f).
If section 13(f) is going to be a meaningful part of the canon of
securities regulation, it should be coherent with the overriding mission and
policy of the doctrine. By framing the application of the law within the
four corners of market manipulation prevention, speculation deterrence,
uniform enforcement against fraud-on-the-market, and prohibitions on
unjust enrichment, it becomes easier to identify the regulation’s potential
as a safeguard of fair dealing and obstruction for deceptive practices.
Applying these concurrent considerations to section 13(f)’s administration
and enforcement, it becomes apparent that its current state of
administration falls short and is in need of an overhaul.
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VI. THE WAY TO MORE RATIONAL AND HELPFUL
FORM 13F DISCLOSURES
The central argument of this Note is that the SEC and federal courts
should structure the implementation and enforcement of investment
company disclosure rules, particularly those made in fulfillment of
statutory responsibilities under section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, in a way
that balances the competitive interest of investment managers in their
strategic decisions with the public interest in transparent and efficient
markets. Having explained a compelling reason for adopting such a
policy, as well as a doctrinal foundation upon which it can rest, I will now
suggest improvements to the practical administration of the section 13(f)
requirements and exemption that will align enforcement of this law with
the interests outlined above.
A. Update Rule 13f-1 to Provide Comprehensive Reports
It was emphasized at the time the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
were passed that part of their purpose was to allow regulation to keep pace
with growth and development in the financial industry.194 Nearly forty
years later, the rules dictating the management of this disclosure provision
have not been substantially reviewed and are now woefully out of date.
Considering the dramatic rise of private investment vehicles, including
hedge funds, “long/short strategies” generally, and the increased
complexity of widely available financial instruments, Dodd-Frank
section 929X, which mandates the inclusion of all short positions on a
monthly basis,195 is a step in the right direction. The rules should also be
amended to mandate disclosure of all the most common exchange-traded
financial instruments. This should include options contracts and a
calculation of investment leverage for the investment company and its
products individually, where applicable. Details of this sort and specificity
are what made the original section 13(f) disclosures valuable in light of
market realities of that time. In addition, the minimum reporting threshold
should be raised from $100 million in assets under management to a
substantially higher level. This would reduce the number of reporting
entities required and allow the SEC to focus on the firms that are more able
to make a discernible impact on securities markets due to the size of their
holdings. The new threshold should consider the leverage ratio so that it
might still catch small, but highly leveraged funds that have a real potential
to affect the market in public securities.
194
See Ford, supra note 44 (“[W]e must be sure that laws and regulations written 30 or 40 years
ago do not unfairly interfere with the need for changes in our modern-day markets.”).
195
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In contemporary markets, with long-oriented stock investing
constituting only a small piece of the overall investment management
world and widely contained within the mutual fund and exchange traded
fund industries, which are regulated by the Investment Company Act of
1940,196 Form 13F contents are too incomplete to be of value. It makes
little sense to enforce costly compliance with a regulation that provides
such limited beneficial effects for the market as compared with its original
design. Rather than publishing a list of reportable securities under section
13(f), the universe should be expanded vastly and to a degree that the SEC
could publish a short list of security types that would remain nonreportable.
Third, timing must be adjusted, although it is arguably the most
difficult issue to deal with cleanly. In order to provide investment
managers enough time to capitalize, at least in part, on their research, near
immediate disclosure is not a workable solution. The quarter-end-plusforty-five-days timeframe is certainly long enough, but is altogether
arbitrary. In February 2013, the New York Stock Exchange and others
petitioned the SEC to change the guideline to quarter-end-plus-two-days.197
While the petition makes the valid point that quarter-end-plus-forty-fivedays renders the information stale in contemporary markets and worth little
in the way of tracking an investment manager,198 this timeframe is just as
arbitrary and, in cases where transactions occur at the end of the quarter,
could be too short.
A better model would be to require rolling “material change in
holding” reports within a fifteen-business day reporting window. Modeled
after the public company material event disclosure requirement commonly
known as Form 8-K,199 this flexible standard should provide fund investors
and the investing public with information once it becomes material but
would not burden the asset manager with filing positions that are of no
consequence. Once asset managers have accumulated a certain dollar
amount of a given holding, they would be required to add that holding to
their report and file it within three weeks. The same amendment would be
required if the holding fell below the dollar threshold. Subsequently, if the
position grew or shrunk by a predetermined increment, the reporting
requirement would be triggered and the fifteen-day reporting window
196
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would begin. For investment companies that have not crossed a trigger
point with respect to any of their holdings in thirty business days, a
periodic report would be due.
This system would have the effect of increasing disclosure frequency
only when relevant, and would be continuous enough to be of real value to
the investor community at large while providing the management company
enough time to make meaningful headway on a program of acquisition or
dispensation. At the time these measures were formulated, the SEC would
have been concerned with the costs implied by such a potentially high rate
of frequency,200 but advances in technology have decreased the burden of a
reporting requirement as simple as this.
If these changes were implemented and the results were tabulated in a
more accessible format than the SEC’s cumbersome online document
retrieval service (i.e., EDGAR),201 the information would be more readily
usable, not only for investors and the market generally, but also for
regulators concerned with systemic risk and dramatic shifts in capital
allocation. It is reasonable to hope that these changes would enhance the
SEC’s policy development efforts and its investigatory work in fraud
detection as well.
B. Develop and Promulgate a Clear and Strict Standard of Review for
Granting Confidential Treatment
The standard for exemption, as reviewed in Part II.B, should be revised
to require an affirmative showing of likely and substantial imminent harm
to the asset manager’s financial condition in order to obtain exemption
from the reporting requirements. The 1998 guidance letter and 2013
guidance update on CT Requests left open the ways in which an
institutional money manager can claim to be harmed by disclosure of the
firm’s positions, provided that the harm is “substantial” and demonstrable
by historical evidence of “market reaction” to public disclosure by that
investment manager.202 Demonstrating that a “market reaction” could
result in less favorable outcomes for the CT filer than would be likely if he
were not required to disclose his positions is not a sufficient standard from
the perspective of market efficiency and true fairness.
The SEC should promulgate more defined standards aimed at
advancing the spirit of disclosure pervasive throughout U.S. securities law,
which detail the types of harm that are preventable by way of confidential
treatment and define “substantial” in clearer terms. These measures would
200
Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,701 (June 22, 1978).
201
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help to limit the cases where confidential treatment is granted to those in
which regulatory requirements, and not the underlying market dynamics
attached to transparency in general, would be the principal source of the
loss. This requires separating the “purely regulatory” from those effects
that are grounded in economic substance. The burden of making the
distinction should be on the CT requester. This would help to make the
cases where confidential treatment is available less ambiguous, which, in
turn, would increase competitive interests by ensuring that some
institutions do not receive preferential regulatory treatment over others and
making it less likely that an institution would successfully be able to obtain
confidential treatment principally for the benefit of its own investment
returns.
Moreover, exemptions should not be granted for set periods of time up
to one year, but rather for shorter increments that can be renewed upon
subsequent application to the SEC. Providing for prolonged and
impenetrable immunity from disclosure does not allow the disclosure
requirements to react to changing market conditions and investor status.
Lastly, once exemption periods lapse, the SEC should publish the
applications for exemption, redacted for otherwise privileged or
confidential material, so as to build public understanding of how the
decisional standard for exemption is made. This would allow for ongoing
and transparent precedent-building that would both further the interest of
certainty among applicants and do much to advance perceptions of fair
play among other smaller market participants and observers.
C. Enforce Civil Liability for Abuse of Confidential Treatment
As discussed, there has only been one action against an investment
management firm for alleged section 13(f) malfeasance.203 The action was
related to the failure to file over a period of more than three years and
resulted in a cease and desist order and a civil penalty of $100,000.204
Quattro, the hedge fund manager subject to the fine, had assets under
management of approximately $900 million.205 Outside of this slap on the
wrist, the unqualified lack of reported enforcement actions for failure to
properly file or for abusing the exemption process illuminates the
diminished extent to which the SEC polices Form 13F filings. While there
is no doubt that the Commission has authority to prosecute for failing to
file or for willful material misstatements and omissions,206 the exemption
process has never been the subject of SEC enforcement.
203
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Because any strategic use of the exemption provision to selectively
disclose holdings is potentially manipulative of markets and takes
advantage of information imbalance to the detriment of the public and for
the benefit of enriching the manager, civil liability should arise in cases
where exemption is granted and it later comes to light that it was not
warranted. The SEC could easily conduct a contextual examination of
applications during the on-site examinations of investment managers
already conducted by its Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (“OCIE”) division.207 The SEC should be expressly
authorized to take civil action against those institutional investors for the
amount they were enriched as a result of wrongfully withholding
information from the market, plus interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
When the federal government set out to regulate the public market in
securities, it took it upon itself to provide all market participants with a
better opportunity to protect themselves from fraud and loss and,
conversely, to identify the prospect of gain. It chose to do this by requiring
the disclosure of certain information not otherwise readily available to all
investors. In the 1970s, the scope of relevant information deemed
necessary to secure an equalized opportunity was expanded to include the
holdings of institutional investment firms, because it was decided that
transparency and fairness ultimately trumped the interests of pure
competition. Section 13(f) was born as a result, but has been long
neglected.
Fully realized, the statute could make large strides toward protecting
investors by accelerating the point at which the informational interests of
the less informed investors are favored over those of the more informed.
This information sharing would still allow investment managers the
opportunity to act on their advantages, but not in perpetuity or until they
have maximized their profits. Instead, there would come a point when they
must cede what might prove to be a meaningful residual opportunity to the
public. This would spur broader economic efficiency in financial markets
and, more importantly, would better equalize opportunity for gain across
all groups of participants, without regard to the status quo distribution of
resources.
At the same time, reporting exemptions act as a steam valve, ensuring
that the regulatory regime does not unduly disincentivize important
institutional investment research. It remains, however, that section 13(f)
CT Requests should be granted only in limited and extraordinary situations
207
National Exam Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/off
ices/ocie.shtml (last modified Aug. 19, 2013).

2013]

PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY

805

where demanding compliance with the reporting requirements would, in
itself, cause losses. Otherwise, information should be deemed reportable
and the filing requirement should be enforced accordingly.
The improvements to section 13(f) administration suggested in this
Note would bring us dramatically closer to realizing the broader goals of
securities regulation including, most notably, a fair and transparent public
market in securities. Because the changes would allow comprehensive
access to institutional investor holdings data on controlled terms and in a
way that strikes a balance between the institutional investors’ interest in
concealing their strategic positioning and the public interest in efficient and
accessible markets, a revamped section 13(f) could provide the public with
a real opportunity to more readily understand the forces animating the
pricing of public securities without undermining the benefits of conducting
proprietary research in the first place. Then, finally, it would be feasible to
avoid the privatization of informational advantage in public markets and
better provide fair opportunity consistent with the purpose of securities
regulation and just society alike.

